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This paper discusses similarities and differences in the political and economic 
prospects for Angola and Mozambique.  Central to the posing of these questions is the 
meaning and usefulness of putting these two countries in the same category.  While both 
share some elements of a common colonial history, their similarities are in many respects 
outweighed by their differences.  Angola is a country whose economy is dominated by 
huge oil revenues and whose governing party, the MPLA, recently won a military victory 
over its long time opposition, UNITA.  UNITA, though now much weakened, neverthe-
less represents the legitimate interests of a large segment of the population, whose home 
provinces are the most agriculturally favored in the country.  Mozambique is a country 
with many fewer natural resources, but in which the ruling party, FRELIMO, has fully 
embraced a policy of liberalization and opening of the economy.  Its main opposition 
party, RENAMO, originated as a creature of foreign powers and lost its principal distin-
guishing feature of anti-Marxism when the governing party itself abandoned Marxism 
beginning a decade after independence.   
Political and Economic Prospects for Mozambique and Angola* 
 




 Several of the questions posed for this conference fall under one overarching 
theme:  What is the content of the term “Lusophone”?  It is obvious to all that 
Mozambique and Angola share a common colonial language and that they have a 
colonial history and administrative structure that are in various ways similar, but do these 
facts make it reasonable to treat them as part of a coherent group?  One is tempted to 
compare Lusophone countries with other groups such as former British or French 
colonies, but even here we do not have a particularly good analogy once we get outside 
of Sub Saharan Africa.  If we take, e.g. the USA, India and New Zealand, we have three 
countries which were all colonized by the same imperial power, all of which have the 
same colonial language, and all of which are today democracies.  Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to conceive of many cases where it is useful to group these countries together for 
analytical purposes or in which such a grouping would help us to understand what is 
going on in each or what their future prospects are. 
 
 Similarly, there are more differences than similarities among the Lusophone 
African countries (and even more if we include Brazil in the group), though one can find  
areas where they share some characteristics.  A brief enumeration of these will then allow 
us to proceed to the differences which are in most cases more useful when taking a 
forward looking view. 
 
1.  All are low income Sub Saharan countries with the “usual” problems of poverty, low 
levels of human and physical capital, arbitrary and artificial borders inherited from 
colonial times which result in a multiplicity of ethnicities within each. 
 
                                                 
* Paper Presented to the National Intelligence Council. 
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2.  All speak Portuguese as the principal official colonial language.  However, there are 
drastic differences even in this case.  It has been estimated that only a quarter to a third of 
Mozambicans speak Portuguese with any fluency while there are many in Angola who 
speak only Portuguese, not having learned any African language at all.  In fact it is 
rumored that the President of Angola himself is in this category though, if true, this is a 
fact that they would rather not see publicized. 
 
3.  All share a common colonial heritage.  While true in a formal sense, there were big 
differences here as well.  Angola was always more favored, not only with a better natural 
resource base and closer communications with Portugal and the Atlantic trading system, 
but also as a destination for the Portuguese themselves.  Angola was more “Portuguese” 
and was closer to actually being a province of Portugal (which Mozambique was also, at 
least formally) prior to independence. 
 
4.  All suffered from destructive civil wars immediately following an independence 
process which was more the result of events in the colonial power than a result of any 
military or political victory in the colonies.  This is true, but understates the singular 
destructiveness of the Angolan conflict which not only lasted longer than in Mozambique 
but which was fundamentally different in nature as well.  
 
 What is clear is that there is some feeling of solidarity among Lusophone 
countries but in reality there is little in the way of geography or economics to really tie 
them together.  Even ties with Portugal are likely to become less important than ties to 
the EU more generally since Portugal itself is but a small part of this larger much more 
economically important entity.  Accordingly, it is likely that other ties which have more 
immediate importance will be the ones which dominate in the future.  Seen in this light, 
Angola’s attempts to dominate the Lusophone organizations are really but a sideshow 
since this organization is not the one which is economically most important to any of the 
members.  Insofar as it is important, the Angolan government does not enjoy any 
particular image of justice or truth among these countries.  Rather, they simply have more 
money. 
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 Here perhaps it is useful to underline some of the most important differences 





 In Angola independence found the new country in the throes of an armed struggle 
in which the various liberation fronts had never sorted out their differences enough to 
coalesce into a single united national liberation front.  The MPLA, being urban based, 
ended up on top at least as much because they were in Luanda in the first instance as 
because of any claim to general legitimacy.   
 
 The immediate start to the Angolan war thereafter was very much related to the 
geopolitical concerns connected with oil and with the avowedly Marxist tone of the 
MPLA.  However, the warring factions had very real differences which would themselves 
generate tension and conflict even in the absence of geopolitical influences from outside.  
Basically, the two main factions, UNITA and the MPLA, each represent major 
constituencies which also separate into rival ethnicities as well.  UNITA represents the 
mainly Ovimbundu people of the central highlands where the primary economic activity 
is agriculture.  MPLA represents the largely Mbundu and mixed blood coastal and urban 
people who, unlike the interior, were under direct Portuguese domination from very early 
in the colonial period.  A third faction, the FNLA, is dominated by northern members of 
the Kongo ethnic group, but has not presented an independent threat to the MPLA since 
early in the post-colonial period. 
 
 The two main groups are both large and have legitimately opposing economic and 
political interests.  On the one hand, agricultural and urban-industrial interests naturally 
find themselves in opposition during the process of development since what one buys the 
other sells and vice versa (recall, for example, the case of the debate over the Corn Laws 
in Britain, or the presidential campaigns of William Jennings Bryan in the US).  On the 
other hand, groups in control of ports and coastlines or other trading routes to the outside 
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have always found themselves in conflict with  groups in the interior, who must depend 
on those in charge of the trade routes for their access to foreign markets. 
 
 These facts must be taken into account on the basis of any forward looking 
evaluation of the future of the political parties in Angola.  The MPLA, having won a 
military victory over UNITA and being in possession of huge amounts of revenue from 
oil and diamonds, will feel no need to change its modus operandi in the near future.  
Their current policies are working for them (or at least for the political elite) and they will 
benefit from some breathing room both because of the general relief that the war is over 
and the fact that oil revenue remains high. 
 
 UNITA, on the other hand, is in a very splintered and ineffective state.  Having 
lost the war, it has lost any claim to an ability to deliver politically for its constituencies, 
but those constituencies remain important (about 40% of the overall population) and will 
continue to have basic economic interests that are opposed to those of the MPLA’s core 
constituents.  Basically, these interests line up with those which are pro-agriculture in 
general both in terms of pricing and in terms of infrastructure development, exchange rate 
policy and trade policy.  However, in the near term these are unlikely to be addressed as 
the MPLA will see no real need to reward the popular base of their erstwhile enemies, 
while that base will get some benefit simply from the cessation of hostilities. 
 
 Eventually, however, it is likely that UNITA, or some portion of it, will regain 
some measure of legitimacy as the representative of the (mainly agricultural) interests of 
the Ovimbundu people of the central highlands.  Those members of the UNITA 
leadership capable of being coopted will be rewarded with some posts in the government 
in Luanda, though real political power will remain centralized in the MPLA and the 
Office of the President.  Provincial power will continue to be subordinated to the center 
as provincial governors and other important officials will be chosen by Luanda.  The 
likely upshot then, is a factionalization of UNITA between those willing to join the 
power structure in Luanda and those who will want to represent the core populations 
which have been their historical strength. 
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 In terms of elections, it is still uncertain when or whether these will be held.  
Eventually, it is likely that they will be, but it is extremely unlikely that votes will be 
counted in any way that might threaten MPLA domination.  That is to say, even if 
UNITA were in reality a serious competitor (which is unlikely in the short term given 
their disarray) the MPLA would not allow them to win.  Accordingly, it is unlikely that 
the situation will reach the point where armed conflict will enter the equation.  Of course, 
if it were to occur there is no doubt that the MPLA and the FAA will do whatever is 
needed to maintain their hold on power. 
 
 Economically, Angola is a country with one of the greatest unrealized potentials 
in all of Africa.  Blessed with good ports and good agroclimatic conditions for 
agriculture, Angola could if properly managed develop into a high income nation much 
as is happening in Botswana and South Africa.  However, there are several important 
issues that present serious obstacles to this path, particularly given the political divisions 
discussed above. 
 
 Most important is the legacy of the conflicts themselves.  To a degree unmatched 
elsewhere in Africa the twenty five year conflict was incredibly destructive not only of 
people but also of capital, both public and private.  Whole cities were destroyed along 
with virtually all of their supporting infrastructure, as well as roads, bridges and other 
facilities.  In addition, millions of landmines are scattered across the countryside as well 
as inside cities themselves.  Even getting back to the pre-conflict starting point is a task 
of major proportions in a country where large numbers of people remain dependent on 
humanitarian aid.  Resettlement and return to sustainable production for rural populations 
has been, of course, a necessary prerequisite for any further progress. 
 
 Prior to independence Angola was a major agricultural exporter, particularly of 
maize and coffee but also of other products.  The main area of agricultural comparative 
advantage is the central highlands which are also the home of the Ovimbundu people, 
primary supporters of UNITA.  This in and of itself presents a problem given the fact that 
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heavy investments in the income generating potential of their erstwhile enemies are not at 
the top of the victorious MPLA’s priority list. 
 
 However, the huge oil discoveries (and to a lesser extent diamonds) have led to 
further problems which inhibit economic development: 
 
1.  Pronounced “oil syndrome” effects such as an overvalued exchange rate distort the 
economy in a way that puts agriculture at a disadvantage and impedes its growth 
 
2.  The government’s own focus is primarily on oil and not on the more time consuming 
and difficult progress of agricultural development.  This, and the resulting anti-
agricultural bias of investments makes progress outside of the oil sector slower. 
 
3.  The general and extreme corruption associated with oil revenues retard the ability of 
the private sector to function. 
 
 In economic terms this means that the Angolan economy will remain dependent 
on oil to support the government and political elite, who are largely divorced from the 
realities of the domestic economy, relying instead on oil-derived foreign exchange.  
Economic policy will likely remain as it has been - an ad hoc series of initiatives 
designed to keep things from collapsing into chaos but without any real drive to use the 
oil resources to develop the economy.  Indeed, the latest “IMF-friendly” economic team 
at the historically weak Ministries of Finance and Planning and the Central Bank do not 
have any greater degree of independence from the Office of the President than have past 
teams.  This means that they can implement policies up to the point where the interests of 
the elite are threatened, at which point they will be arbitrarily reversed. 
 
 This points to an observation which is important in understanding the Angolan 
government.  Unlike most countries, the economic ministries and the Central Bank have 
no real power or independence.  In reality, economic control and power reside in the 
Office of the President and in the oil company, Sonangol, which is the source of the 
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money which supports the whole structure.  Accordingly, any outreach effort by 
Sonangol must be understood as being part and parcel of the government’s own political 
aims since control of oil wealth is the first and most important goal of the political elite.  
Using their expertise to assist other countries (e.g. Sao Tome) is not only an economic 
venture, it is a political one as well. 
 
 A final comment on Angolan outreach is in order but must be labeled clearly as 
belonging to the realm of speculation.  The Angolan Army or FAA (Forcas Armadas de 
Angola) is not nearly so much of an independent political entity as is the case of armies 
in other countries.  Clearly, they had a major real military task to perform for many years 
and were therefore preoccupied with that.  However, one way to interpret the current 
incipient adventurism of the Angolan government (and it is more than incipient in the 
case of, e.g. Congo) is as a way to keep the army occupied without having to 
decommission it.  The experience of 1992 burned into the minds of the political 
leadership the need to maintain a large military force at the ready but at the same time it 
is quite dangerous to run the risk of large heavily armed formations permanently 
stationed in or near large cities.  Accordingly, finding an occupation for the soldiers 





 The political characteristics of the Mozambican resistance group RENAMO  are 
fundamentally different from those of UNITA in Angola.  Unlike UNITA, RENAMO is 
not based on representation of an important ethnic group with distinct economic interests.  
Rather, it was originally created by the then-Rhodesian secret police to influence a 
country which controlled transport routes to the interior of the continent.  When Rhodesia 
became Zimbabwe, the South African security apparatus took over direction of 
RENAMO and its military activities. 
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 RENAMO’s political platform was from the beginning an anti-Marxist one.  
FRELIMO had taken control of the country when the Portuguese departed in the mid-
1970’s and shortly thereafter became an avowedly Marxist party.  The anti-Marxist 
platform of the opposition served it well in terms of garnering external support which it 
needed in the absence of a real power base (at least initially) among the population.  
However, FRELIMO’s reversal and adoption of free-market policies in the 1980’s led to 
a major problem for RENAMO from which it has never recovered since its principal 
raison d’etre of anti-Marxism was no longer relevant. 
 
 Today, it is quite difficult to see the difference in political or economic programs 
that would result from a RENAMO government.  There is no real distinguishing factor to 
which one can point as the driving rationale for the party.  Rather, it is now much more of 
a regional phenomenon in which RENAMO claims that they will deliver (the same 
programs) more to the provinces which FRELIMO has allegedly not favored.  Hence, the 
most populous province of Zambezia is an area of support for RENAMO and while the 
party does not seem to offer any programs or policies that differ materially from those of 
the current government, they do claim that they will “bring home more bacon” than has 
happened so far. 
 
 What of FRELIMO?  Here, the situation is somewhat less than transparent but 
there are several different strands within the party that can be distinguished.  First, it must 
be said that there remain a healthy core of committed party members who cannot imagine 
giving up control of the government or operating in an opposition mode.  It is still highly 
likely that in spite of the relatively well run elections in the past, the party would not 
permit itself to be thrown out of power if in fact this seemed possible in the near future.  
However, it is possible to discern the beginnings of what is an opposing faction within 
the party which could perhaps even someday transform into an independent party in its 
own right. 
 
 This, for lack of a better term, can be labeled the “bourgeois” wing of FRELIMO 
and is a direct result of the privatization process which has been proceeding for the past 
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several years at the behest of the World Bank and the IMF.  The party has made sure that 
major privatizations as well as new private sector activities have the active participation 
of Mozambicans, giving rise to a still small but growing class of domestic capitalist 
entrepreneurs.  These are, of course, closely aligned with the FRELIMO leadership and 
indeed are in many cases members of it.  If the market oriented transformation continues 
and succeeds, then this class will naturally grow and accumulate more power both in the 
party and in the country at large.  The day will inevitably come when this faction’s 
interests come to rival those of the old-style FRELIMO party members for whom party 
control is paramount. 
 
 However, it is unlikely that this scenario will play itself out in the next elections.  
If FRELIMO’s expected candidate, Armando Guebuza, is in fact elected, it is not easy to 
see exactly which way the government will go.  On the one hand, Guebuza is usually 
identified as one of the more “old-style” party leaders in that he is in the camp that cannot 
imagine the party ever giving up power.  On the other hand, he himself is owner of 
several large capitalist enterprises and so is also a member of the embryonic group of 
domestic capitalists.  What still has not happened is any division of interests between the 
party and the nascent industrialists and Guebuza’s selection is in one sense a way to 
avoid confronting this issue for at least another several years. 
 
 Overall however, FRELIMO must be lauded as an extremely rare creature in 
African politics - a party that has transformed itself from Marxist to market without major 
upheavals, and which is about to have one of the most rarely seen creatures of all - a 
voluntarily retired African president. 
 
 In economic terms Mozambique is a much less well endowed country than is 
Angola.  In colonial times it was never as favored as was Angola in terms of investment 
or in terms of integration into the economy of Portugal and the Atlantic in general.  In 
terms of physical endowments, it has less abundant rainfall though it does have 
substantial agricultural potential, particularly in the northern regions of the country. 
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 Historically, these northern areas were not well integrated with the south, where 
the capital of Maputo is economically closer to neighboring South Africa than to the 
north of Mozambique itself.  Both before and after independence, the southern region 
was dependent upon food imports from abroad, paying for these with the earnings from 
workers sent overseas, principally to South African mines.  With the decline of these 
remittances over the post-colonial period the country has been forced to look for other 
means of support.  Among these are earnings from transit to interior countries, various 
mineral developments, though none of these approach the scale of Angolan oil or 
diamonds, and agricultural exports. 
 
 Without oil or other “easy” sources of income, the FRELIMO government of 
Mozambique came to the decision to abandon its Marxist command-economy strategy 
much sooner than has been the case in Angola (which has still not truly abandoned its 
centralized mode in many ways).   After early moves in this direction in the mid-1980’s 
FRELIMO is now firmly committed to its policy of liberalization and engagement with 
the world economy.   
 
 The results have been striking.  Growth rates of 10% and higher have been posted 
in recent years, though a series of natural disasters has caused several periods of negative 
growth.  Currently, the government shows no signs of returning to the previous command 
economy mode, though there remain problems of promoting growth in a more 
widespread manner than has occurred to date. 
 
 It is this that is the central problem of Mozambican development today.  Capitalist 
development is always rather uneven.  Investment flows to favored areas and sectors 
while those less well endowed are left behind.  This inevitably means a degree of 
inequality that is anathema to many who were educated in Marxist notions of equality of 
outcomes rather than equality of opportunity.  Continuing to channel investments into 
those areas with the highest returns will be the main route to growth over the long term.  
This means that urban areas will continue to outpace rural ones in terms of income levels, 
but does not mean that agricultural development and the investments needed to promote 
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it can be relegated to secondary importance.  Indeed, without agricultural development, 





 The discussion above demonstrates that in many ways, discussing Angola and 
Mozambique at the same time can lead to overgeneralization of what are in reality two 
very different countries.  While sharing many aspects of colonial history, the two 
countries today find themselves in very different circumstances and with very different 
outlooks for the future.  One is tempted to point to Angola as having the most potential 
for future growth, but at the same time it also has the most serious obstacles to progress.  
Mozambique is still one of the poorest countries in the world but has made great strides 
over the past decade.  Perhaps one of the most telling comparative observations that can 
be made, however, is the following:  Given a choice between being a poor peasant 
smallholder in Angola or in Mozambique, it is very likely that the latter would prove 
more attractive. 

